

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 9512

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: CONVERSATION OF UK REP WITH
MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION ON 15 NOVEMBER

FOLLOWING IS AMBASSADOR ROSE'S TEXT OF RECORD OF CONVERSATION
DETAILING HIS CONVERSATION WITH MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION -
AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV, MR. SMIRNOVSKY AND MR. RYABINKOV ON
15 NOVEMBER.

BEGIN TEXT:

WESTERN PROPOSALS

CONFIDENTIAL

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1. AFTER SOME HEAVY BANTER ABOUT OUR EXPECTATIONS OF HOW
LONG THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LAST, MR. KHLESTOV ASKED FOR
CLARIFICATION OF OUR CONCEPT OF THE TWO NEGOTIATING PHASES.
WHAT WOULD BE THE END OF THE FIRST PHASE, AND WHAT WOULD IT

INCLUDE? WHEN WOULD THE SECOND PHASE BEGIN - AFTER THE END OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE FIRST PHASE, OR WHEN IT HAD BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED? MR. ROSE REPLIED THAT THE FIRST PHASE WOULD COVER INITIAL US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS, THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE GOAL OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING, AND PROVISION FOR A SECOND NEGOTIATING PHASE. THE SECOND NEGOTIATING PHASE WOULD BEGIN SOME TIME AFTER THE NEGOTIATION OF THE FIRST PHASE WAS COMPLETE.

2. MR. KHLESTOV ASKED WHAT THE COMMON CEILING WAS, AND TO WHOM IT APPLIED. MR. ROSE REPLIED THAT IT COVERED THE AGGREGATE OF ALL FORCES ON EACH SIDE; MORE, ONE COULD NOT SAY NOW. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, HE ADDED THAT THE IMPLICATION OF WHAT HE HAD SAID WAS THAT EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN PHASE 2 REDUCTIONS.

3. MR. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE WEST WISHED TO START WITH REDUCTIONS OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES. MR. ROSE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS FOR THIS: FIRST, THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WERE THE LARGEST CONTINGENTS OF OUTSIDE FORCES IN EUROPE; WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS AN ADVANTAGE IN MAKING A START WITH OUTSIDE FORCES. SECOND, THE US AND USSR HAD, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR SIZE AND CAPABILITIES, A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE.

SOVIET PROPOSALS: ARTICLES 2 AND 3

4. MR. ROSE SAID THAT HE WAS PUZZLED BY VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN DESCRIBED BY MR. KHLESTOV AND MR. SMIRNOVSKY AS "SIMPLE AND PRACTICAL", BUT WHICH SEEMED TO HIM VERY COMPLICATED, IN PARTICULAR ARTICLE 2 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 3. HE HAD HOPED FOR ELUCIDATION IN AMBASSADOR KLEIN'S STATEMENT, BUT HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED. HOW WAS ONE TO DIVIDE THE 20,000 MEN ENVISAGED FOR THE SOVIET FIRST STAGE BOTH BETWEEN COUNTRIES ON A PRO RATA BASIS AND ACCORDING TO THE CRITERION OF SIMILARITY OF UNITS? THIS QUESTION WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORKING OUT OF THE PROTOCOL WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET PROPOSAL. HE QUOTED TO ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEM FIGURES FROM THE I.I.S.S. MILITARY BALANCE FOR DIFFERENT MANPOWER AND ARMAMENT STRENGTHS OF UNITS/ FORMATIONS ON THE TWO SIDES. MR. KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE 20,000 WOULD BE DIVIDED BETWEEN THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PROPORTION TO THE TOTAL OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON REDUCTION OF SIMILAR UNITS OFFERED THE BEST, SIMPLEST AND MOST EASILY VERIFIABLE MEANS OF REDUCTION. THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT UNITS OF THE SAME DESIGNATION BUT DIFFERING STRENGTHS, E.G. A WARSAW PACT DIVISION AND AN AMERICAN DIVISION, WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS. THE TOTAL MANPOWER TO BE WITHDRAWN WOULD BE DIVIDED ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS, AND UNITS WITH APPROXIMATELY THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AND EQUIPMENT

WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE FOUND ON THE TWO SIDES TO MAKE UP THIS TOTAL. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO EQUIPMENT IN CASES WHERE COMPARABLE UNITS, E.G. AN AIR FORCE SQUADRON, HAD DIFFERENT QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT IN DIFFERENT ARMED SERVICES. THE SAME PROBLEM OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS OF "SIMILAR" UNITS OR UNITS OF THE SAME SIZE WOULD ALSO ARISE UNDER THE COMMON CEILING PROPOSAL. MR. KHLESTOV CONFIRMED THAT THE PROTOCOL ENVISAGED BY THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT WOULD BE WORKED

OUT IN PARALLEL WITH THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SAME TIME. MR. ROSE SUGGESTED THAT THIS DID NOT TIE IN WITH WARSAW PACT ASSERTIONS THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED QUICKLY. IN HIS EXPERIENCE THE WORKING OUT OF SUCH DETAILS CONSUMED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME. MR. KHLESTOV RETORTED THAT SO WOULD THE CALCULATIONS NECESSARY FOR OUR COMMON CEILING PROPOSAL. MR. ROSE POINTED OUT THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD INVOLVE LESS COMPLICATED CALCULATIONS, BECAUSE THEY WERE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES. MR. KHLESTOV SAID THAT ONE MUST SUBORDINATE ARITHMETIC TO SECURITY. ONE COULD NOT REDUCE ONLY SLOW OR IMMOBILE WEAPONRY.

VERIFICATION

9. MR. ROSE ASKED WHAT FORM OF VERIFICATION THE RUSSIANS INTENDED. HE HAD NOT BEEN ENLIGHTENED BY AMBASSADOR KLEIN'S ASSERTION THAT ARTICLES 3 AND 7 OF THE WARSAW PACT DRAFT WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. AS M. WILLOT HAD POINTED OUT, CONFIDENTIAL

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IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF BELIEVING THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD INFRINGE THE AGREEMENT BUT ONE OF CONFIDENCE THAT EACH SIDE COULD ASSURE ITSELF THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS BEING FULFILLED. MR. KHLESTOV THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH NATIONAL MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE TWO SIDES TO TELL WHETHER A DIVISION WAS ON THE MOVE. MR. ROSE POINTED OUT THAT THE PHASE 1 REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED BY THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE SOME VERY SMALL BODIES OF TROOPS, THOUGH THE AGGREGATE MIGHT BE QUITE LARGE. MR. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT MR. ROSE WAS OVEREMPHASIZING TECHNICAL ASPECTS AS AGAINST POLITICAL ONES. WOULD A COUNTRY REALLY VIOLATE AN UNDERSTANDING WHICH IT HAD JUST SIGNED? MR. ROSE ASKED WHETHER THE PROTOCOL SUGGESTED BY THE RUSSIANS WOULD GIVE DETAILS OF THE NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN. MR. SMIRNOVSKY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT COULD BE WORKED OUT.

SOVIET VIEWS ON THE WESTERN APPROACH

10. MR. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THREE MAIN POINTS STRUCK HIM ABOUT THE WESTERN APPROACH:
A. WE WERE IGNORING THE FACT THAT GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES CUT BOTH WAYS. THE NEARNESS OF THE SOVIET FRONTIER

TO CENTRAL EUROPE MIGHT MEAN THAT REINFORCEMENT WAS EASIER THAN FOR THE AMERICANS, BUT IT ALSO MEANT THAT SOVIET SECURITY WAS MORE DIRECTLY AT STAKE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

B. THE WEST WERE TAKING PARTICULAR ELEMENTS IN THE FORCE RELATIONSHIPS IN ISOLATION, LEAVING OUT ENTIRELY SUCH OTHER ELEMENTS AS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIRCRAFT.

C. THE WEST APPEARED TO BE APPROACHING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INTENTION OF PREPARING FOR CONFRONTATION AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES, WHILE THE EAST WERE TRYING TO ESCAPE FROM CO

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